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GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
  
 An appeal and a petition for mandamus seek review of an 
order of the district court judge remanding this proceeding to 
state court pursuant to Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, 
Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S.Ct. 177, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 
(1981).  The central issues presented are whether this Court's 
review is barred by the operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), and, if 
not, whether the remand was proper.  Because review of a district 
court's remand order is generally available, if at all, only 
through a mandamus proceeding, we will dismiss the appeal at 94-
7338.  We conclude that we may review the remand order by way of 
a mandamus, and because remand should have been ordered, we will 
also deny the petition. 
 
 I 
 Nine plaintiffs-respondents-appellees (the 
"Balaziks"),1 recent purchasers of real property in Dauphin 
County, Pennsylvania, commenced this putative class action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Dauphin County on March 1, 1994, against 13 defendants, including 
defendants-appellants Dauphin County and the Dauphin County Board 
of Assessment Appeals, and defendant-appellant-petitioner Swatara 
Township (collectively, "Swatara").  The Balaziks, and the other 
similarly situated plaintiffs, seek to recover damages allegedly 
sustained as the result of the defendant taxing authorities' 
                     
1
.  For ease of reference, we will refer to the nine plaintiffs-
respondents-appellees collectively as the "Balaziks." 
  
practice of reassessing and taxing at fair market values newly 
acquired and rehabilitated properties without similarly 
reassessing longer held, non-rehabilitated properties.  The 
Balaziks allege that this "Welcome Stranger" policy results in a 
higher tax burden for taxpayers such as themselves, and 
constitutes a violation of their rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
 On March 18, 1994, defendants Dauphin County, Dauphin 
County Board of Assessment Appeals and Swatara removed the case 
from the Court of Common Pleas to the U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
1441 and 1443.  Swatara has candidly admitted that it sought 
removal in order to avoid the effects of Murtagh v. County of 
Berks, 535 Pa. 50, 634 A.2d 179 (Pa. 1993), a recent decision of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which held that taxpayers need not 
exhaust the administrative remedies available to them under state 
law in order to file a § 1983 action in state court.  The 
remaining ten defendants did not join in Swatara's removal 
notice.2 
                     
2
.  It appears from the record that the following defendants did 
not join in the removal:  Derry Township, Lower Paxton Township, 
Lower Swatara Township, Central Dauphin School District, Derry 
Township Public Schools, Lower Dauphin School District, 
Middletown Area School District, and Susquehanna School District.  
Susquehanna Township and Steelton-Highspire School District, 
which had not joined initially, later concurred in the removal.  
App. 19-20. 
  
 Having removed the case to federal court, Swatara 
proceeded to seek dismissal of the Balaziks' complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure of 
the Balaziks to pursue state procedural remedies.  In response, 
the Balaziks made a timely motion to have the proceedings 
remanded to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), claiming that 
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
 On May 11, 1994, the district court rejected the 
Balaziks' contention that it lacked jurisdiction, but ordered the 
case remanded as a matter of comity pursuant to Fair Assessment 
in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S.Ct. 
177, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981)  (holding that taxpayers are barred by 
the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 damages actions in 
federal courts based on the administration of state tax systems). 
 The district court also noted that not all plaintiffs 
had joined in the notice of removal, although it did not rule on 
this issue in deciding Balazik's motion to remand.  Dist. Ct. 
Memo. at 3 n. 1. 
 On June 1, 1994, at Docket 94-7338, Swatara appealed 
the remand order, and on June 10, 1994, Dauphin County and the 
Dauphin County Board of Assessment Appeals also filed a notice of 
appeal from the remand order.  On June 20, 1994, at Docket 94-
7350, Swatara petitioned this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 
to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the district court judge 
to vacate his remand order and to adjudicate the case.  These 
actions have been consolidated. 
  
 As discussed hereafter, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars 
review, by direct appeal or otherwise, of remands ordered on the 
basis of a defect in removal procedure or for lack of federal 
subject matter jurisdiction.  On appeal, and in support of its 
petition, Swatara has argued that the remand order is (1) 
reviewable because it was predicated on McNary comity grounds, 
and (2) improper because McNary should be read to permit only 
dismissals of proceedings, not remands. 
 On the other hand, before us, but not before the 
district court, the Balaziks have urged that the failure of all 
the defendants to join in the removal was a defect in the removal 
procedure warranting remand.  They suggest that this defect bars 
our review by the operation of § 1447(d). In addition, the 
Balaziks contend that remand is in all events proper because 
McNary is a permissible basis for remand. 
 The threshold question, then, is whether we have 
jurisdiction to entertain Swatara's objections to the remand, 
and, if so, on what basis. 
   
 II  
 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), with one exception not applicable 
here (see footnote 7, infra), provides that "[a]n order remanding 
a case to the State court from which it was removed is not 
reviewable on appeal or otherwise. . .."   This apparently global 
bar to appellate review of remand orders has been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court to apply only to remand orders issued pursuant 
  
to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),3  Thermtron Products, Inc. v. 
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976) ("Thermtron"), and since 
Thermtron was decided we have held a variety of remand orders to 
be reviewable.  See Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1355 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 69 (1993) (citing 
Third Circuit cases reviewing remand orders); see also Carr v. 
American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 1994); Pacor, Inc. v. 
Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984).  However, when the bar of 
§ 1447(d) does apply, it is absolute, forbidding not only appeals 
but also writs of mandamus, the "or otherwise" referred to in the 
statute.  Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 336. 
 Thus, whether we may review the May 11th remand order 
of the district court turns on the basis for the remand.  As we 
noted in PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 1993), 
"[c]ases may be remanded under § 1447(c) for (1) lack of district 
court subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal 
procedure."  Id. at 352.  Our review is therefore barred only if 
one of these grounds formed the basis of the remand. 
 The Balaziks contend, first, that no review may be had 
because not all of the defendants joined in the removal, thus 
                     
3
.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994), as amended, provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
 A motion to remand the case on the basis of 
any defect in removal procedure must be made 
within 30 days after the filing of the notice 
of removal under section 1446(a).  If at any 
time before final judgment it appears that 
the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 
 
  
constituting a "defect in removal procedure."  We agree that the 
failure of all defendants to remove creates a defect in removal 
procedure within the meaning of § 1447(c).  We would have been 
required to resolve the issue of our review on that basis, had 
the district court so held.  However, as earlier noted, and as we 
discuss infra, the district court did not rule on a § 1447(c) 
ground.  Thus, the bar to appellate review commanded by § 1447(c) 
and § 1447(d) is inapplicable in light of the district court's 
ground of decision, and we are obliged to disagree with the 
Balaziks that our review is forestalled in the instant case.  
 
 A 
 Section 1446(a) of 28 U.S.C. requires that "[a] 
defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil 
action . . . shall file . . . a notice of removal."  Despite the 
ambiguity of the term "defendant or defendants," it is well 
established that removal generally requires unanimity among the 
defendants.  See, e.g.,  Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 
178 U.S. 245, 247, 20 S.Ct. 854, 44 L.Ed. 1055 (1900) ("if a suit 
arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or if 
it is a suit between citizens of different states, the defendant, 
if there be but one, may remove, or the defendants, if there be 
more than one. . .."); Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68 (3d 
Cir. 1985) ("Section 1446 has been construed to require that when 
  
there is more than one defendant, all must join in the removal 
petition").4    
 Failure of all defendants to join is a "defect in 
removal procedure" within the meaning of § 1447(c), but is not 
deemed to be jurisdictional.  See Johnson v. Helmerich & Payne, 
Inc., 892 F.2d 422, 423 (5th Cir. 1990) (the "failure to join all 
the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional 
defect");  In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 713 
(7th Cir. 1992); McGlinchey v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 
866 F.2d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Here, while it appears from the record that not all of 
the defendants joined in the removal notice, this fact was merely 
noted, and neither ruled upon nor relied upon, by the district 
court in entering its remand order.  Dist. Ct. Memo. at 4 n.1.  
Thermtron forestalls review only when the remand order is issued 
"pursuant to" § 1447(c).  Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 343.  "If a 
trial judge purports to remand a case on [§ 1447(c) grounds], his 
order is not subject to challenge in the court of appeals, by 
mandamus or otherwise."  Id. (emphasis added).    
                     
4
.  The unanimity rule may be disregarded where: (1) a non-
joining defendant is an unknown or nominal party; or (2) where a 
defendant has been fraudulently joined.  See McManus v. 
Glassman's Wynnefield, Inc., 710 F.Supp. 1043, 1045, n.5 (E.D.Pa. 
1989) (citing Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 673 F.Supp 1445, 1447 
n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1987).  See also 1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, Moore's 
Federal Practice ¶ 0.168[3.-2-2].  Another exception is when a 
non-resident defendant has not been served at the time the 
removing defendants filed their petition.  See Lewis, 757 F.2d at 
69.  Swatara has not argued that any of these exceptions apply to 
the present case. 
  
 Thus, our review is forestalled only when the stated 
reasons for the remand include procedural or jurisdictional 
defects:  "[O]nly remand orders issued under 1447(c) and invoking 
the grounds specified therein . . . are immune from review under 
§ 1447(d)."  Id. at 346 (emphasis added).  The mere existence of 
a defect in removal procedure, where timely objection is not made 
and where the district court does not rely on § 1447(c) as the 
ground of its decision, does not preclude our review.  Hence, our 
review is not proscribed even if a remand could have been ordered 
based on a § 1447(c) ground, but was not.  Because the district 
court expressly declined to base its remand order on § 1447(c) 
grounds, we cannot rely upon a § 1447(c) procedural defect, i.e. 
the failure of all the defendants to join in the removal notice, 
as a bar to our review.5 
 
 B 
 The Balaziks next argue that the district court's 
remand, even if based only on McNary grounds, is nonetheless 
unreviewable.  They state that "[r]eview [of remand orders] 
should not be permitted when, as here, the district court's 
decision to remand is based upon grounds, that it has authority 
to consider, that lead the district court to conclude that it is 
                     
5
.  Our examination of the record shows that the Balaziks did not 
draw the district court's attention to the failure of all the 
defendants to join in removal, even though the district court 
recognized that fact.  Thus, they neither preserved the issue for 
appeal nor acted within the 30 day statutory time limit provided 
for in § 1447(c).  See McGlinchey, 866 F.2d at 653. 
  
required to remand the action to state court."  Plaintiff's 
Letter Memorandum 7/18/1994 at 6-7.   
 This argument, which amounts to the contention that 
§ 1447(d) bars review in all cases where a remand is required, 
must be rejected, as it contravenes the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Thermtron that review is barred only when the remand is based on 
§ 1447(c): "There is no indication whatsoever that Congress 
intended to extend the prohibition against review to reach remand 
orders entered on grounds not provided by the statute."  
Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 350.   Further, it fails to consider this 
Court's decisions reviewing, and in some cases affirming, remands 
that were not based on § 1447(c).6  As we have previously noted: 
 [W]hile section 1447(d) was intended "to 
prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases 
by protracted litigation of jurisdictional 
issues," -- and the district court is 
therefore given the last word on whether it 
has jurisdiction to hear the case --, that 
policy does not apply when the district court 
has reached beyond jurisdictional issues or 
issues of defective removal, and has remanded 
for other reasons. 
Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., Ltd., 933 F.2d 1207, 1211 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 302 (1991) (quoting 
Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351). 
                     
6
.  See, e.g., Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 
1989) (holding review appropriate where district court had 
remanded case for procedural defects after 30-day time limit in 
§ 1447(c) had expired); Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., Ltd., 933 
F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 302 
(1991) (holding remand based on a forum selection clause was not 
within § 1447(c), hence reviewable, and proper).  See also Aliota 
v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1355 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing cases); 
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984). 
  
 Because the district court did not purport to remand 
these proceedings on grounds contained in § 1447(c), the 
jurisdictional bar of § 1447(d) does not apply, and we have 
jurisdiction to review the May 11, 1994 order of the district 
court.7 
 
 III 
 As the Supreme Court explained in Thermtron, "because 
an order remanding a removed action does not represent a final 
judgment reviewable by appeal, '[t]he remedy in such a case is by 
mandamus to compel action, and not by writ of error to review 
what has been done.'"  Id., 423 U.S. at 352-53 (quoting Chicago & 
Alton R.R. Co. v. Wiswall, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 507, 508, 23 L.Ed. 
103 (1875)).  Thus, we have held that an appeal will not 
ordinarily lie from a remand order, and that review is to be had, 
if at all, only by mandamus.  See PAS, 7 F.3d at 352-53;  see 
                     
7
.  Swatara also contends that we may review the remand under an 
exception to §1447(d) pertaining to cases removed pursuant to the 
Civil Rights Removal Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1443.  This argument is 
without merit, as § 1443 provides for removal by a defendant for 
the protection of the defendant's civil rights (or interests in 
respecting such rights).  See City of Greenwood, Miss. v. 
Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 814, 824 n. 22 (1966).  Here, state taxing 
authorities are allegedly seeking to perpetuate, rather than 
eradicate, tax inequalities.  As one author has noted, removal 
under § 1443 must be "sharply distinguished from the removal of 
an action brought by a plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 
redress a violation of the plaintiff's civil rights." 1A J. Moore 
& B. Ringle, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.165 (emphasis added).  
Moreover, § 1443 is available only when the civil rights at issue 
are matters of racial equality.  State of Georgia v. Rachel, 384 
U.S. 780, 792 (1966).  There is no contention that race is 
implicated in the instant dispute. 
  
also Antonio Garcia v. Island Program Designer, Inc., 4 F.3d 57, 
59 (1st Cir. 1993) (remand reviewable only by mandamus).8 
 Because mandamus is the appropriate review mechanism, 
we will dismiss Swatara's appeal and confine ourselves to a 
consideration of whether the writ of mandamus should issue. 
 
 IV 
 Swatara strenuously objects to the district court's 
decision to remand the case.  In essence, Swatara contends that 
McNary, which itself affirmed a dismissal, permits no other 
result, such as a remand.  We understand the policy enunciated by 
the Supreme Court in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 
U.S. 343 (1988) (upholding remand to a state court of a removed 
case involving pendent state law claims partly on comity grounds) 
to apply with equal force to a McNary remand.  We therefore 
conclude that remand is an option open to the district court in 
                     
8
.  There are exceptions to this general rule.  For instance, a 
direct appeal may sometimes be had when a remand involves a 
"collateral order" under Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury 
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1983).  See Carr v. 
American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that an 
appeal may lie from both a dispositive order and a subsequent 
remand when the district court's dispositive order is separable 
from the subsequent order of remand and meets the finality 
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and where that final dispositive 
order triggers the order of remand);  Foster (order remanding a 
case pursuant to a forum selection clause is collateral final 
order on the merits which may be reviewed by appeal).  But see 
PAS, 7 F.3d at 353 (stating that "development of the collateral 
order doctrine did not nullify Wiswall's holding that review in 
such cases should be accomplished by mandamus").  Here, we are 
dealing with a "garden variety" remand involving no collateral 
issues, hence no exceptions to the general rule of non-
appealability (as contrasted with mandamus) pertain. 
  
McNary cases provided that there exists the same predicate to 
dismissal required by McNary, i.e. a "plain, adequate and 
complete" remedy at the state level.  Because Pennsylvania law 
provides such a remedy, remand here was proper and Swatara's 
request for the writ will therefore be denied. 
 The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, provides that 
"[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the 
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a 
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of 
such State."   Section 1341 has been read to bar both injunctive 
and declaratory actions involving state taxes in federal court.  
California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982).  
On facts similar to those in the present case, the issue in 
McNary was whether § 1341, which in terms refers only to 
equitable relief, also prevents federal courts from entertaining 
damage actions predicated on an allegedly unconstitutional tax. 
 Rather than determine whether the Tax Injunction Act 
also bars subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 damage suits in 
federal courts, the McNary Court concluded that the need for 
deference to the states in matters involving the administration 
of state and local taxes meant that "taxpayers are barred by the 
principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the 
validity of state tax systems in federal courts.  Such taxpayers 
must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, 
  
provided . . . that those remedies are plain, adequate, and 
complete. . .."  McNary, 454 U.S. at 116 (emphasis added).9   
 The Balaziks' § 1983 challenge to the "Welcome 
Stranger" taxpayer policy is in all relevant respects identical 
to the action considered in McNary.  The McNary Court, however, 
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action 
without addressing the issue of whether a remand might have been 
                     
9
.  The McNary Court, at 454 U.S. 100, 108 n. 6, cited with 
approval the explanation given by Justice Brennan, in Perez v. 
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), for federal-court deference in 
matters regarding state tax administration: 
 
 The special reasons justifying the policy of 
federal noninterference with state tax 
collection are obvious.  The procedures for 
mass assessment and collection of state taxes 
and for administration and adjudication of 
taxpayers' disputes with tax officials are 
generally complex and necessarily designed to 
operate according to established rules.  
State tax agencies are organized to discharge 
their responsibilities in accordance with the 
state procedures.  If federal declaratory 
relief were available to test state tax 
assessments, state tax administration might 
be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might 
escape the ordinary procedural requirements 
imposed by state law.  During the pendency of 
the federal suit the collection of revenue 
under the challenged law might be obstructed, 
with consequent damage to the State's budget, 
and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk 
of taxpayer insolvency.  Moreover, federal 
constitutional issues are likely to turn on 
questions of state law, which, like issues of 
state regulatory law, are more properly heard 
in the state courts. 
 
Id. at 128, n. 17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  
  
appropriate, and it is this question which we are now called upon 
to resolve. 
 In support of its argument that McNary requires 
dismissal rather than remand, Swatara cites Thermtron for the 
proposition that a district court may remand a removed case only 
on the grounds stated in § 1447(c) (lack of jurisdiction or 
defect in the removal procedure).   Although Thermtron contained 
passages which support this reading, the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of Thermtron in Cohill makes clear that the 
provisions of § 1447(c) do not exhaust the scope of the federal 
remand power.  As this Court has already recognized, "the 
circumstance that a remand is based on non-statutory grounds, 
though important post-Thermtron, is, post-Cohill, of diminished 
significance.  Cohill clearly overruled Thermtron to the extent 
that Thermtron had held that only statutory grounds for remand 
are authorized."  Foster, 933 F.2d at 1214. 
 In Thermtron, the district court had remanded the case 
to state court in order to avoid delay due to the size of its own 
docket.  The Thermtron Court, after noting that removal had been 
proper and that the district court therefore had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the dispute, stated that: 
 [W]e are not convinced that Congress ever 
intended to extend carte blanche authority to 
the district courts to revise the federal 
statutes governing removal by remanding cases 
on grounds that seem justifiable to them but 
which are not recognized by the controlling 
statute.  . . .  Because the District Judge 
remanded a properly removed case on grounds 
that he had no authority to consider, he 
exceeded his statutorily defined power. . .. 
  
Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351.   
 This passage appears to limit remand to grounds 
specified by a "controlling statute," and Swatara has seized upon 
it to support its argument that remand under the non-statutory 
McNary rational must be improper.  An examination of Cohill and 
our post-Cohill decisions suggests otherwise. 
 Cohill held that it is within the discretion of a 
district court to remand to a state court a removed case 
involving pendent claims once the plaintiff has dismissed the 
federal question counts of the complaint.  After pointing out 
that  "[i]n Thermtron, the District Court had no authority to 
decline to hear the removed case," the Court stated that "[i]n 
contrast, when a removed case involves pendent state-law claims, 
a district court has undoubted discretion to decline to hear the 
case.  The only remaining issue is whether the district court may 
decline jurisdiction through a remand as well as through 
dismissal."  Cohill, 484 U.S. at 356. 
 The Court in Cohill thus explained that while 
Thermtron's application of mandamus applies when a federal court 
is obliged to hear the case in the first instance, "an entirely 
different situation is presented when the district court has 
clear power to decline to exercise jurisdiction."  Id. 
 In Foster, we held that the district court was within 
its authority in remanding, rather than dismissing, an otherwise 
properly removed case when a forum selection clause granted the 
plaintiff the right to choose a state forum, stating that: 
  
 Unlike the district court in Thermtron, the 
district court here did not refuse to hear a 
case properly before it.  Indeed, the 
district court in this case accepted 
jurisdiction and, in the exercise of that 
jurisdiction, determined, as a threshold 
matter on the merits, that . . . the case 
ought not [to] have been in federal court. 
Id. at 1215-16.  We concluded that "as no one doubts the district 
court's power to dismiss pursuant to a properly construed forum 
selection clause if a plaintiff violates the clause, 'Congress's 
silence in the removal statute [as to other potential grounds for 
remand] does not negate the power to . . . remand . . ..'" Id. at 
1215 (quoting Cohill, 484 U.S. at 354) (footnote omitted, 
emphasis supplied in Foster).  In so holding we emphasized that 
"Congress is concerned that removal procedure be handled in a 
manner that promotes economy, convenience, and fairness -- the 
very concerns used by the Court to justify remand in Cohill."  
Foster, 933 F.2d at 1216.10 
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.  Other courts have similarly held that Thermtron in light of 
Cohill does not absolutely limit the instances in which a remand 
may be had.  See Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., Ltd., 842 F.2d 31, 
36 (2nd Cir. 1988) (holding that abstention in a removed case was 
a proper ground for remand, and citing Cohill for the proposition 
that when a district court has the authority to dismiss a case, 
it also has authority to remand a case in appropriate 
circumstances). 
 Our decision in Bradgate Associates, Inc. v. Fellows, 
Read & Associates, Inc., 999 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1993) also 
addressed the remand principle set forth in Foster.  We stated 
therein that "[w]e do not read Foster to say that district courts 
may remand a case merely because they have the authority to 
dismiss. . .."  Id. at 750 n. 4.  This statement must be 
understood in context.  Bradgate involved a removed action which 
had been consolidated with an action originally filed in federal 
court.  Upon determining that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the disputes, the district court remanded both 
cases to state court.  We reversed only in part, holding the 
  
 We believe that the same reasoning applies to the 
present case.  Here, unlike Thermtron, it is clear that the 
district court not only had the authority to decline to hear the 
case, but was in fact required to relinquish jurisdiction under 
McNary.  Here, there is no question of the district court 
improperly refusing to hear a case properly before it, as 
occurred in Thermtron.  In such circumstances, requiring the 
district court to dismiss, rather than remand, a removed § 1983 
damage action involving state taxation policies and practices 
would promote neither comity nor efficiency, and would detract 
from the importance of state courts hearing § 1983 claims which 
challenge state taxation regimes, a jurisdiction which the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently asserted with vigor.  See 
Murtagh v. County of Berks, 535 Pa. 50, 634 A.2d 179 (1993) 
(holding that § 1983 actions may be brought directly in state 
trial courts without first having to exhaust other administrative 
and judicial remedies available to them under state law in order 
to file a § 1983 action in state court). 
 As in Foster, permitting a remand in such circumstances 
helps sustain the district court's "inherent powers to correct 
abuses of federal practice and procedure, vindicating the 
(..continued) 
remand of the federal action to be improper as "lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction terminates a case originally filed in federal 
court because [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(h)(3) 
instructs the district court to dismiss cases which do not meet 
jurisdictional prerequisites."  Id. at 751.  Bradgate thus stands 
for the unsurprising proposition that only removed cases may be 
remanded.  Here, of course, we deal only with a removed state 
court case. 
  
improper use of removal," 933 F.2d at 1216.  In short, we see no 
reason why comity should prevent us from remitting such disputes 
to the courts of the very sovereignty whose interests informed 
the McNary doctrine in the first place. 
 We therefore hold that remand is available under 
McNary, subject to the limitation expressed in that case that 
there must exist a "plain, adequate and complete" remedy at the 
state level. 
 
 V 
 The Tax Injunction Act removes jurisdiction from 
federal courts over injunctive or declaratory state taxation 
actions provided a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy is 
available at the state level.   McNary similarly states that 
comity will only be exercised in damages actions if the state 
remedy is "plain, adequate and complete,"  McNary, 454 U.S. at 
116, a formula which the Court equated with the "plain, speedy 
and efficient" language of the Tax Injunction Act.  We have 
understood that this requirement, like that of the Tax Injunction 
Act, is to be read narrowly. Hardwick v. Cuomo 891 F.2d 1097, 
1105 (3d Cir. 1989).   A state remedy is thus considered "plain, 
speedy and efficient" provided state procedures do not "preclude 
presentation and consideration of . . . federal rights."  
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1981).  
 In 1991 we examined the relevant causes of action 
cognizable in Pennsylvania courts and Pennsylvania procedures for 
appealing tax assessments, and concluded that Pennsylvania 
  
provides an adequate remedy for the purposes of the Tax 
Injunction Act.  Behe v. Chester County Bd. of Assessment 
Appeals, 952 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1991).  Upon review of the state 
law canvassed in Behe, we see no need to rehearse these findings 
here, other than to note that since that time the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has made it easier for taxpayers to bypass existing 
statutory procedures and bring an action directly in state court. 
 We hold that Pennsylvania provides a "plain, adequate 
and complete" remedy for § 1983 plaintiffs challenging state 
taxation policies.  Thus, remand was proper under McNary.11 
                     
11
.  We note that the fact that it was the state taxing 
authorities themselves which removed the case does not alter our 
conclusion that the comity rational of McNary applies.  Like the 
jurisdictional limitations imposed by the Tax Injunction Act, the 
comity rational of McNary acts as a restriction on the power of 
the courts (or, more precisely in McNary cases, on the exercise 
of that power).  See Hardwick, 891 at 1104 (defendant taxing 
authorities may not waive the jurisdictional bar of the Tax 
Injunction Act); Cox Cable Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of 
Norfolk, Va., 739 F. Supp. 1074, 1076-77 (E.D.Va. 1990) 
(defendant taxing authorities may not waive the comity bar to 
adjudication of state tax damage actions). 
 VI 
 Mandamus, authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651(a), is traditionally used to "confine an inferior court to 
a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it 
to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."  Roche 
v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).  Thus, "a writ 
is not available unless the district court has committed a clear 
abuse of discretion or engaged in conduct amounting to usurpation 
  
of the judicial power."  PAS, 7 F.3d at 353 (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
 Because we have determined that the district court 
acted properly in remanding the case to state court, we find no 
reason or ground to issue the writ, which would vacate the 
district court's remand order.  Swatara's petition at Docket 94-
7350 will therefore be denied, and the appeals from the remand 
order at Docket 94-7338 will be dismissed.  
 Costs will be taxed equally amongst Swatara Township, 
County of Dauphin, and the Dauphin County Board of Assessment 
Appeals. 
